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# Integrated Country Strategy

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**Office of Palestinian Affairs**

**U.S. Mission Jerusalem**

*For Public Release*

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## 1. Chief of Mission Priorities

The U.S. Office of Palestinian Affairs (OPA) and its affiliated interagency counterparts are responsible for U.S. relations with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Palestinian people. Through OPA and its interagency partners, including USAID, the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC), and others, the United States actively engages a wide range of political, economic, media, cultural, and educational contacts in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. The October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel and the ensuing Israeli military campaign in Gaza, and the effects of that conflict on the West Bank and East Jerusalem, have driven the mission's activities since. The mission's long-standing primary goal – to advance the conditions necessary for the realization of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Palestinians' enjoyment of measures of freedom, security, dignity, and prosperity equal to that of Israelis – is even more urgent now. Our engagement is focused on establishing conditions conducive to negotiations that would end the conflict and lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state living peacefully alongside Israel.

The PA must undertake significant reforms to build credible institutions of governance that can respond to the needs of its population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, establish itself as the Palestinian governmental authority in Gaza, be a peaceful and prosperous regional partner, and meet its commitments and responsibilities on trade, security, and other issues that impact the wider region. Within the directives of U.S. law and policy, targeted U.S. diplomacy supports governance, education, human rights, and civil society as well as a reformed (more accountable and effective) PA; promotes a viable private sector-led economy and social sector development; and advances the professionalism of the PA security force under civilian command and control. We will undertake efforts to maintain diverse contact networks and deliver reporting that increases understanding of the issues affecting the Palestinian population. Additionally, we work closely with international partners to improve the quality of life for Palestinians; significant coordination will be required for recovery efforts and the eventual reconstruction of Gaza.

A continuing U.S. priority is to help move the Palestinian economy from donor dependence and structural deficits to a healthy model of sustainable private sector-led investment, growth, increased trade, and job creation and skill development. Through public diplomacy and foreign assistance programming, engagement with the Palestinian private sector, and economic policy advocacy with the PA and the Israeli government, we seek to improve the investment climate, remove obstacles to commerce and investment, and cultivate a spirit of entrepreneurship, particularly among Palestinian youth and women. We also encourage inclusive, private sector-led economic growth; provision of critical services including health, water, sanitation, energy, telecommunications, and education; and robust civic engagement among all groups. A focus on climate sustainability and youth/gender empowerment underpins efforts across sectors.

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U.S. support to advance a two-state solution also includes maintaining the status quo at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and Christian institutions in Jerusalem. Our messaging and engagement consistently call for all sides to exercise restraint and refrain from provocative rhetoric and actions that violate the historic status quo regarding holy sites in Jerusalem. We will continue to push for close and frequent consultations between Muslim and Christian institutions and the Israeli government to establish a more regularized approach to address and resolve points of contention.

We will maintain clear efforts to promote the long-standing U.S. policy that the final status of Jerusalem, including ultimate sovereignty and borders, is a subject for future negotiations. In support of this policy, our engagement includes, inter alia, opposition to evictions in East Jerusalem and other unilateral actions which undermine final status negotiations. Our support of the two-state solution also involves opposition to expansion of settlement activity, settler violence, home demolitions, acts of terrorism, public expressions of antisemitism or Holocaust denial/distortion, and escalatory actions in the UN and other international organizations. We engage with Israeli and Palestinian leaders to urge both sides to take actions that lower tensions, end violence, and ultimately reinvigorate long-standing coordination mechanisms and relationships.

Advancing the re-integration of Gaza under a reformed Palestinian Authority and supporting recovery and reconstruction will be another major priority for the Mission. Prior to the war in Gaza which started on October 7, 2023, a population of 2.1 million were living under the control of Hamas (designated by the U.S. government as a foreign terrorist organization) and an Israeli military blockade since 2007; over 80 percent of the Gazan population was living under subsistence conditions and dependent on donor aid. Following Hamas's October 7 terrorist attack and the subsequent IDF military operation, Gaza is in ruins, with estimates that 80 percent of its housing and infrastructure is destroyed, the economy shattered, and a complete breakdown of essential services across all sectors including health, education, water, wastewater, and energy. There has been an almost complete collapse of all forms of governance by the de facto (Hamas) authority, along with a deterioration of law and order. In addition, more than 35,000 Gazan Palestinians have been killed and an estimated 1.9 million people are internally displaced. Reconstruction time and costs will be immense, and the humanitarian situation will remain dire for the foreseeable future. The removal of Hamas's governing apparatus from Gaza will pose unique challenges going forward, including the PA resuming full governance and security control in the Strip. The U.S. government will aim to advance a transformative change in governance in Gaza that can lead the next phase of recovery and reconstruction.

Through public diplomacy, we will promote U.S. values and interests through collaborative academic and professional exchanges, English language learning, alumni engagement, and initiatives for young Palestinians to improve their skills in science, technology, and innovation – key sectors for Palestinians' long-term economic prosperity and job creation. We will harness

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the power of U.S. higher education to build enduring links with Palestinians who share our values and interests. Our public engagement will disseminate accurate information about and understanding of U.S. policy, institutions, society, and values to foster more positive views of the United States among Palestinians and the belief that the U.S. is and will continue to be a good partner for achieving their aspirations and peace. OPA will leverage PD programs to promote media literacy and professional independent journalism and to engage and to collaborate with Palestinian thought leaders to promote U.S. values and policies. Finally, we will identify and support the next generation of Palestinian leaders, equipping them to be credible voices for peace.

There are more than 700,000 U.S. citizens in Israel, Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. The consular sections in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, combined under a single Consular Country Coordinator, provide consular services to Americans and Palestinians in the Palestinian Territories. Those services include addressing instances of uneven treatment for U.S. citizens. A dynamic security and political environment present challenges to the timely provision of consular services to U.S. citizens in the West Bank and Gaza.

Finally, our facilities and staff are spread across Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. The need for additional office space in Jerusalem and the West Bank is urgent, particularly as we rebuild our INL office and USAID shifts its mission presence from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Given the restrictions on USDH travel to Gaza and intensifying needs there, we need additional Locally Engaged (LE) Staff resident in Gaza to facilitate reporting, post-conflict recovery, outreach, and oversight of grants and a new American Space. Facilities upgrades will be managed to accommodate increased staff and provide the platform needed to execute policy priorities in both Jerusalem and the West Bank. In addition, we will remain focused on the implementation of diversity and inclusion initiatives, as well as strategies to reduce the mission's environmental footprint.

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## 2. Mission Strategic Framework

- **Mission Goal 1:** Advance a comprehensive and lasting peace through a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. **Mission Objective 1.1** | U.S. government is a mediator for peace.
  - **Mission Objective 1.2** | Support for a two-state solution grows among the Palestinian public and political entities and more Palestinians renounce terrorism and choose non-violent means to advance their ambitions for self-determination and statehood.
  
- **Mission Goal 2:** Palestinian institutions, both government and non-government, effectively address the needs and aspirations of the Palestinian people.
  - **Mission Objective 2.1** | Advance credible, representative, and accountable governance that respects human rights and rule of law, and that effectively and equitably delivers services.
  - **Mission Objective 2.2** | Nurture a diverse, independent, and active civil society and media, which advocate for the public's needs, promote good governance and transparency, and ensure all segments of society are represented across East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.
  - **Mission Objective 2.3** | Advance the re-integration of Gaza under a reformed PA and support recovery and reconstruction.
  
- **Mission Goal 3:** A prosperous Palestinian economy, led by a thriving private sector, provides equitable and inclusive economic opportunities and improves daily life for Palestinians.
  - **Mission Objective 3.1** | U.S. engagement and advocacy strengthen a sustainable Palestinian economy that creates jobs, spurs growth, and attracts investment.
  - **Mission Objective 3.2** | U.S. engagement and advocacy encourage equitable access to basic needs and resources that improves Palestinians' daily lives and economic opportunity, including increased movement of goods and persons.
  
- **Mission Goal 4:** Protect U.S. citizens, resident and visiting, and conduct risk-based visa processing.
  - **Mission Objective 4.1** | Safeguard U.S. citizens visiting or residing in the West Bank and Gaza including ensuring quick and thorough investigations on any deaths of U.S. citizens by appropriate authorities.
  
- **Management Objective 1:** Operational effectiveness enhanced by upgrades of annexes and mission residences and environmentally friendly management policies for greener operations.

- **Management Objective 2:** Workforce performance and customer satisfaction enhanced, by recruiting, developing, and retaining a diverse, agile, productive workforce that embraces and models innovation, accountability, and parity of services across OPA.

### 3. Mission Goals and Objectives

**Mission Goal 1** | Advance a comprehensive, lasting, and just peace through a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. [incorporates USAID Development Objective 4]

**Description** | The U.S. approach is to advance equal measures of freedom, security, and prosperity for Israelis and Palestinians in tangible ways in the immediate term, which is important in its own right, but also as a means to advancing and preserving the prospects of a negotiated two-state solution, in which Israel lives in peace and security alongside a viable, independent Palestinian state. The Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the ensuing Hamas-Israel conflict in Gaza have devastated both populations. Both the difficulty and urgency of achieving a two-state solution are clearer than ever. The renewed global focus on this conflict, and the two-state solution as the best means of ending it, is an opportunity for the U.S. government and its partners to take serious and immediate strides toward a comprehensive, lasting, and just peace.

**Objective 1.1** | U.S. government is a mediator for peace.

- **Justification** | The U.S. government should focus on bringing the current hostilities in Gaza to an end in accordance with the principles outlined by Secretary Blinken in Tokyo in November 2023, and UN Security Council resolution 2735 fostering an environment conducive to resuming direct negotiations between the parties. Fostering that environment goes beyond ending the current conflict in Gaza and will require extensive engagement in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. We will encourage PA leadership to take steps that will make them a more credible and capable partner for political negotiations, including pressing them to make political reforms that will pave the way for future national elections. We will also continue to press both Israel and the PA to take steps to improve conditions on the ground that improve the daily lives of Palestinians and strengthen the position of their leadership to make the decisions necessary for peace and an end to the occupation.
- **Linkages** | MENA JRS 2022-2026 Goal 2, Objective 2.1
- **Risks** | Deterioration of the situation in Gaza or expansion of violence in the West Bank, or regionally. Further actions which are detrimental to a two-state solution or preclude final status negotiations, such as expansion of settlements or the use of violence, undermine the potential for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

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**Objective 1.2** | Support for a two-state solution grows among the Palestinian public and political entities and more Palestinians renounce terrorism and choose non-violent means to advance their ambitions for self-determination and statehood. The U.S. supports Palestinians' non-violent political efforts.

- **Justification** | Palestinian opinion on the two-state solution is mixed. Prior to October 7, support for the two-state solution among Palestinians was low. However, recent polls show that the number of Palestinians willing to accept a two-state solution has risen, especially in Gaza, since October 7. There is also pressure on the PA to renege on previous agreements, including recognition of Israel and commitment to a two-state solution, and some within the Palestinian political and social spheres continue to encourage or glorify violence and see terrorism as a viable form of resistance. U.S. leadership to steer Palestinians at all levels toward non-violence is critical, and we can do so with both government-level diplomacy and public diplomacy that shows the value of negotiations, nonviolent methods for asserting rights and aspirations, and U.S. intervention to make the two-state solution a real possibility. We will continue to support the PA's efforts to meet commitments, especially on security, continued reform of public institutions and governing practices, human rights, respect for civil society and building confidence in public administration that will lead to greater support for the PA.
- **Linkages** | MENA JRS 2022-2026 Goal 2, Objective 2.1
- **Risks** | Without public support and political will, we will be unable to advance a negotiated two-state solution to the conflict. The use of terrorism and violence will undermine the process further. Political fragmentation within Palestinian society, settlement expansion and settler violence, and declining economic and humanitarian conditions can erode trust and inhibit cultivation of conditions needed for a peaceful two-state solution.

**Mission Goal 2** | Palestinian institutions, both government and non-government, effectively address the needs and aspirations of the Palestinian people in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.

**Description** | The PA needs to reform its national governance institutions and enable reform in local governance in collaboration with civil society and private sector organizations to promote inclusive governance, protect civil and human rights, and provide the services to meet Palestinian needs. This will also help the PA gain the trust and confidence of the Palestinian people. Palestinian civil society across East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza play crucial roles in filling governance gaps, protecting civil and human rights, and advocating for the national aspirations of the Palestinian people.



**Objective 2.1** | Advance inclusive, credible, representative, and accountable governance that respects human rights and rule of law and that effectively and equitably delivers services. [incorporates USAID Development Objective 1]

- **Justification** | Governance based on credible legal structures, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and provision of services lays the groundwork for progress on many other issues, including, ultimately, the two-state solution outlined in Goal 1. Palestinians are frustrated by corruption, poor service delivery, lack of political progress on achieving the two-state solution, human rights abuses, and postponement of national elections. This political dysfunction has also left the people of Gaza living under Hamas rule for 17 years, with no end in sight despite intensive Israeli military operations and large-scale destruction in Gaza. Sustained reforms and capacity improvements are necessary to respond to the population's demand for more inclusive, representative, responsive, transparent, and accountable governance and improved services. Processes to decide on and implement these reforms must include women, youth, and other underrepresented groups, informed by dialogue and partnership between civil society, the private sector, and the government. The United States will continue to encourage and assist the PA and provide support to local governance councils within the directives of U.S. law and policy, to build credible institutions of governance and improved service delivery to respond to the needs of the population in both the West Bank and Gaza. We will promote governance reform; encourage the PA to build up their credibility, both domestically and to the international community; help develop security and justice sector institutional capacity to improve transparency, adherence to the rule of law, support for religious freedom, and respect for international human rights standards; promote a healthy operating environment for civil society and the private sector to operate; and encourage effective and equitable delivery of services. Strengthening the PA in this way will create an enabling environment for further U.S. support to the Palestinian people, as described in Objective 3.2.
- **Linkages** | MENA JRS 2022-2026 Goal 4, Objective 4.1, 4.4
- **Risks** | Without a credible government, especially given a potential power vacuum in Gaza, Hamas and other terrorist groups could increase in popularity.

**Objective 2.2** | Nurture a diverse, independent, and active civil society and media which advocate for the public's needs, promote good governance and transparency, and ensure all segments of society are represented across East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. [incorporates USAID Development Objective 1]

- **Justification** | A vibrant civil society is a key component of sustainable democracy, serving as both a key partner and an accountability mechanism to governments by participating in service delivery, promoting civic awareness and engagement, advocating on behalf of the population, supporting dialogue and reconciliation, and holding government accountable. The media, including digital and social media, as a special category within civil society, plays a critical role in developing the civic-mindedness and awareness of current events that a population needs to make informed decisions about their lives and hold institutions accountable. Palestinian civil society actors are dedicated but operating in a challenging environment, facing pressure from the Israeli government and the PA, (and prior, de facto authorities in Gaza), as well as resource constraints and limitations on their freedom of movement. Gazan civil society has been decimated, and a significant number of journalists killed, since October 7. The United States will promote a stronger Palestinian civil society as an indispensable interlocutor on all issues, including state-building negotiations and economic growth. We will support practical measures to develop a robust Palestinian civil society, including by strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) to use non-violent means to protect societal interests, enhance democratic practices, and engage with governing institutions. This effort will include a focus on the issues affecting, as well as the participation and leadership of, underrepresented groups such as women, youth, LGBTQ+ individuals, and persons with disabilities, among others. We will work with journalists, media and digital media outlets, social media influencers, and others to advocate for protection of press freedoms and improved media operating environments, both traditional and online. We will also support credible, professional, and independent media that effectively holds government to account, and work to support improved media literacy among key audiences in order to help counter disinformation.
- **Linkages** | MENA JRS 2022-2026 Goal 4, Objective 4.2, 4.3
- **Risks** | Without an active civil society and media, Palestinians will be unable to hold their government accountable. Political resistance, security risks, perception that initiatives are being imposed rather than generated locally, and cooptation by extremist elements.

**Objective 2.3** | Advance the re-integration of Gaza under a reformed PA and support recovery and reconstruction.

- **Justification** | The division between Gaza and the West Bank and Israel's siege of Gaza since 2007 resulted in a significant deterioration of living conditions, political and diplomatic isolation of Gaza, and increased frustration among Palestinians who are seeking to pursue their aspiration for building a state of their own. More recently, the ongoing war in Gaza has created a vacuum in governance and a massive scale of damage that can create further instability and threatens the advancement of the two-state solution. The war has so far resulted in the destruction or damage of over 80 percent of the health sector, 75 percent of municipal services, 70 percent of the education sector, and more than 1.9 million people are internally displaced. Moreover, there is significant deterioration in economic activity, and the PA's fiscal sustainability is weakened. Support is needed to revive livelihoods and the economy, including through private sector strengthening and trade; rehabilitating damaged infrastructure; restoring services across multiple sectors including education, health, energy, water, wastewater; and building the capacity of local governments to deliver services and become more accountable and effective institutions.
- **Linkages** | MENA JRS 2022-2026 Goal 4, Objective 4.1, 4.4
- **Risks** | Without effective governance and restoration of living conditions in Gaza, the region might become a place of prolonged humanitarian crisis and a fertile ground for the emergence of extremist groups.

**Mission Goal 3** | A prosperous Palestinian economy, led by a thriving private sector, provides equitable and inclusive economic opportunities and improves daily life

for Palestinians. **Description** | The Palestinian economy needs to shift to a more sustainable model, which is less reliant on donor aid and provides increasing economic opportunities.

**Objective 3.1** | Strengthen a sustainable Palestinian economy that creates jobs, spurs growth, and attracts investment. [incorporates USAID Development Objective 2]

- **Justification** | High unemployment rates and economic stagnancy contribute to political and social instability. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), before the conflict began in October 2023, 24.7 percent of all Palestinians were unemployed, though the proportion were particularly high among women (41 percent) and youth aged 20-24 (37 percent). Those numbers surged thereafter in both the West Bank (46 percent) and Gaza (74 percent) by the fourth quarter 2023. In polling across the West Bank, concern about the deteriorating economic situation is correlated with a broader hopelessness about the future. With the destruction in Gaza and continued movement restrictions in the West Bank, both economies will have been devastated, set back years/decades in terms of development and investment. In light of these massive challenges, we will need to seek out means for rapid economic recovery, international investment, and large-scale assistance to encourage private sector-led growth and job creation, reduce barriers to trade, and promote and foster entrepreneurship, IT start-ups, remote-work opportunities, digitalization, and innovation. We will seek to reduce economic restrictions that inhibit economic activity, particularly in Gaza, and especially

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for its post-conflict recovery. We will promote ways to enhance the overall investment climate to shift the Palestinian economy to a more sustainable private sector-led model that is less dependent on donors and the public sector for growth. We will particularly focus on identifying and stimulating private sector initiatives and segments of the economy that are positioned for growth and connect them with trade opportunities, and strengthen SMEs as a base. In addition, we will support technical and vocational education and training, so that we are not only creating jobs but also developing marketable skills and linking them with the economy. In the public sector, the PA faces long-term fiscal challenges, including a small tax base, dwindling donor budget support, and a high public-sector wage bill. More than half of the PA budget goes to public sector employee wage payments, leaving little room for improving delivery of services, development, or capital investments in critically needed infrastructure and development. This situation has severely hampered the PA's ability to function, inhibiting long-term planning and investment. These deteriorating trend lines are accelerated by the near-total destruction of the Gaza economy, increased pressure on the PA fiscal situation since October 7, and the ongoing impacts of movement restrictions on the West Bank economy. We will advocate for Palestinian regulatory and infrastructure reforms and improvements and a business environment that incentivizes investment and promotes private enterprises. For the near term, pursuit of both tracks – building the private sector while improving fiscal performance and regulations – will be needed, but the two efforts will be complementary and support the ultimate goals of generating employment opportunities for diverse populations, increasing digital economy, as well as bolstering economic and fiscal sustainability. We also will advocate for initiatives that increase access to capital, leverage public-private partnerships, and do not establish a dependent relationship to PRC entities.

- **Linkages** | MENA JRS 2022-2026 Goal 2, Objective 2.3, 2.4; Goal 3, Objectives 3.1, 3.2, 3.3; Goal 5, Objective 5.1, 5.2, 5.3
- **Risks** | A lack of economic opportunities for Palestinians could lead to violence and political instability. **Objective 3.2** | U.S. engagement and advocacy encourages equitable access to basic needs and resources that improves Palestinians' daily lives and economic opportunity, including increased movement of goods and persons. [incorporates USAID Development Objective 2]

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- **Justification** | The restrictions on movement and access imposed by Israel on the West Bank and Gaza have long deprived Palestinians from access to resources needed to develop their economy and caused large numbers of vulnerable Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to be dependent on the support of international organizations for their basic needs or even survival. Due to the ongoing Hamas-Israel conflict and the further tightening of these restrictions, more than 200,000 Palestinians lost their permits to work in Israel and the Palestinian economy witnessed a sudden economic depression that collapsed economic turnover by 50 percent in the West Bank and in near entirety in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority continues to lack the resources, authorities, and capacity to resolve these structural problems or the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, especially due to its increasingly high levels of accumulated debt (totaling approximately \$5.5 billion). The increased movement restrictions enacted during the Hamas-Israel conflict intensified obstacles in accessing basic services, such as healthcare, and the consequent and massive economic contraction exacerbated the already high levels of unemployment. U.S. initiatives that improve technical and vocational training could contribute to decreasing unemployment, especially among Palestinian youth, who are most at risk to terrorist organization recruitment. Supporting households' livelihoods, enhancing their productive assets, and facilitating their access to basic necessities will help reduce dependency on humanitarian aid and reduce the probability of engaging in negative coping mechanisms. Non-formal education interventions would provide alternative learning modalities, especially to young children in Gaza, to compensate for learning loss and support their mental and socio-emotional wellbeing. Supporting the restoration of health services in Gaza will contribute to social stability post conflict and will help recuperation and recovery efforts. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and they face increasing risks to food and water security as well as unstable energy access. We plan to support efforts to improve the quality and availability of water and sanitation service and increase efficiency of water use in agriculture through projects to rebuild select water and wastewater infrastructure. Renewable energy opportunities via solar or expanded electricity grid infrastructure would also improve Palestinians' access to energy as well as serve environmental goals. In order to encourage equitable access for these basic needs and resources, we will work with relevant stakeholders to address health, education, water, sanitation, energy, infrastructure, and economic needs.
- **Linkages** | MENA JRS 2022-2026 Goal 2, Objective 2.3, 2.4; Goal 3, Objectives 3.1, 3.2, 3.3; Goal 5, Objective 5.1, 5.2, 5.3
- **Risks** | Inequitable access to basic services, such as health care and a clean environment, could lead to violence and political instability. PA inability to provide access to basic services undermines its credibility as a governance structure for a future Palestinian state.

**Mission Goal 4** | Protect U.S. citizens, resident and visiting, and conduct risk-based visa processing.

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**Description |**

**Objective 4.1 |** Safeguard U.S citizens visiting or residing in the West Bank and Gaza

**Justification |** There are over 35,000 U.S. citizens in Gaza and Areas A and B of the West Bank, who have faced challenges of movement entering and exiting them with Israeli authorities. In July 2023, the Israeli government began implementing changes to travel procedures for U.S. citizens who may now request to enter Israel visa-free for short term visits up to 90 days for business, tourism, or transit. Under the updated travel policies, Israel has committed to treating U.S. citizens equally, without regard to national origin, religion, or ethnicity. Consular operations in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv have been at the forefront of innovative new ways of issuing passports and Consular Reports of Birth. Reporting on our results, advocating for resources to keep up with demand, and collaborating with like-minded posts will be a driving factor in our operations the next five years.

- **Linkages |** Consular Affairs Functional Bureau Strategy, Bureau Goal 1
- **Risks |** An inability to provide timely service to American citizens in need would negatively impact of the State Department's highest priorities: protecting Americans overseas.

#### 4. Management Objective(s)

**Management Objective 1** | Operational effectiveness enhanced by upgrades of annexes and mission residences and environmentally friendly management policies for greener operations.

- **Justification** | Embassy Jerusalem facilities supporting OPA operations and staff are spread across Israel and the West Bank with a large mix of leased and government owned official and residential buildings. Many of the buildings need upgrades or replacement to increase safety, security, functionality, and greening standards. Improving or replacing the facilities will increase employee morale, productivity, and will thereby improve opportunities for the numerous employees working from them to advance American policy goals.
- **Linkages** | MENA JRS 2022-2026 Cross-Cutting Management Objectives
- **Risks** | Risks associated with not achieving this Management Objective include hampered communications, delayed opportunities for cost savings and efficiencies related to consolidation of programs, personnel, and management and security platforms across the Mission.

**Management Objective 2** | Workforce performance and customer satisfaction enhanced, by recruiting, developing, and retaining a diverse, agile, productive workforce that embraces and models innovation, accountability, and parity of services across Embassy Jerusalem.

- **Justification** | After the move of the Embassy to Jerusalem in 2018, two very independent and distinct management sections were merged into a Joint Management Platform (JMP). However, both had organically grown different policies and procedures that resulted in different staffing configurations and levels of ICASS services to customers in different locations. The inconsistency of services between locations has hampered efforts at realizing efficiency of resources and client satisfaction. Increased focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion in recruiting will result in a more agile productive workforce. Heightened emphasis on modeling innovation, accountability, and parity of services across the platform will lead to improved customer morale.
- **Linkages** | MENA JRS 2022-2026 Cross-Cutting Management Objectives, Introduction: Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Access (DEIA) are addressed
- **Risks** | Risks associated with not achieving this Management Objective are lost opportunities to transform the JMP into a higher-performing organization. This could include delayed opportunities for cost savings and efficiencies related to parallel programs with separate personnel, and continued inequality of services. In addition, a workforce that does not fully represent differing perspectives of society may limit our ability to achieve foreign policy objectives and goals.

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